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Can	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  Tell	  Us	  That	  We	  Smell?	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  on	  Richardson’s	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  Taste,	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Centre	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  of	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  In	  “Flavour,	  Taste,	  and	  Smell”	  (forthcoming	  in	  Mind	  and	  Language,	  June	  2013),	  Louise	  Richardson	  discusses	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  scientific	  findings	  could	  confirm	  or	  disconfirm	  our	  judgments	  about	  which	  sense	  we	  are	  using	  to	  perceive	  the	  world	  on	  particular	  occasions.	  Her	  answer	  is	  that,	  so	  long	  as	  non-­‐naturalism	  about	  the	  senses	  is	  a	  theory	  that	  should	  not	  be	  dismissed,	  then	  we	  are	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  assert	  that	  science	  can	  inform	  us	  about	  that	  matter.	  Moreover,	  she	  argues	  that	  non-­‐naturalism	  should	  not	  be	  dismissed,	  and	  so	  we	  are	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  assert	  that	  science	  can	  inform	  us	  about	  which	  sensory	  modality	  we	  are	  using.	  	  	   I	  will	  make	  three	  points	  about	  Richardson’s	  discussion,	  each	  of	  which	  will	  form	  sections,	  1,	  2	  and	  3,	  respectively,	  of	  this	  paper.	  The	  first	  point	  is	  that	  Richardson	  is	  not	  careful	  enough	  in	  setting	  up	  the	  debate.	  She	  does	  not	  keep	  separate	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  science	  can	  inform	  us	  about	  the	  type	  of	  experience	  that	  we	  are	  having	  (what	  I	  will	  call	  “the	  experiential	  question”)	  from	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  science	  can	  inform	  us	  about	  the	  type	  of	  sensory	  modality	  that	  is	  being	  used	  (what	  I	  will	  call	  “the	  modality	  question”).	  I	  will	  explain	  what	  this	  distinction	  is	  and	  illustrate	  how	  she	  fails	  to	  keep	  these	  questions	  clear	  in	  the	  initial	  part	  of	  her	  paper.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  paper,	  Richardson	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  addressing	  the	  modality	  question.	  Second,	  I	  show	  that	  Richardson’s	  conclusion	  that	  non-­‐naturalism	  entails	  that	  that	  science	  cannot	  inform	  us	  about	  which	  sensory	  modality	  we	  are	  using	  is	  false.	  This	  point	  is	  very	  important	  for	  it	  amounts	  to	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  main	  claim	  that	  Richardson	  argues	  for	  in	  her	  paper.	  Therefore,	  considerations	  about	  the	  plausibility	  of	  non-­‐naturalism	  cannot	  be	  used	  in	  the	  manner	  Richardson	  suggests	  to	  argue	  for	  a	  negative	  answer	  to	  the	  modality	  question.	  The	  third	  point	  is	  that	  I	  do	  not	  find	  Richardson’s	  non-­‐naturalist	  response	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  many	  senses	  we	  have	  convincing.	  Moreover,	  I	  am	  concerned	  that	  she	  thinks,	  as	  I	  suspect	  some	  other	  non-­‐naturalists	  do,	  that	  the	  ordinary	  man	  and	  woman	  on	  the	  street	  are	  far	  less	  sophisticated	  than	  they	  are.	  I	  argue	  that	  she	  provides	  us	  with	  no	  good	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  there	  are	  either	  beliefs	  about	  the	  number—actual	  or	  possible—of	  the	  senses	  or	  about	  individuating	  the	  senses	  that	  are	  not	  open	  to	  revision.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  Clare	  Batty	  for	  her	  insightful	  comments	  on	  an	  earlier	  draft	  of	  this	  paper.	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§	  1	   Richardson	  begins	  her	  paper	  by	  discussing	  an	  example	  of	  the	  question	  that	  interests	  her.	  Addressing	  this	  question	  forms	  the	  core	  of	  her	  paper.	  The	  example	  is	  “the	  puzzle	  of	  the	  sweets”.	  Suppose,	  for	  now,	  in	  line	  with	  Richardson,	  that:	  (a)	  in	  general	  we	  think	  of	  flavours	  as	  tasted	  and	  (b)	  science	  discovers	  that	  when	  people	  are	  eating	  sweeties	  and	  their	  noses	  are	  held	  closed,	  they	  can	  only	  distinguish	  some	  components	  of	  their	  flavour,	  components	  like	  sweetness	  and	  sourness.	  It	  is	  only	  when	  their	  noses	  are	  not	  held	  closed	  that	  they	  can	  distinguish	  the	  fruit	  flavour	  of	  the	  sweeties,	  flavours	  such	  as	  cherry	  or	  raspberry.	  Richardson	  asks	  whether	  science	  could	  ever	  tell	  us	  which	  sense	  was	  being	  used	  to	  perceive	  something—in	  the	  example,	  whether	  science	  could	  ever	  tell	  us	  which	  modality	  we	  are	  using	  to	  determine	  which	  fruit	  flavour	  the	  sweeties	  have.	  In	  particular,	  could	  science	  ever	  confirm	  our	  judgment	  that	  we	  taste	  the	  fruit	  flavour	  or	  could	  it	  overturn	  that	  judgment	  and	  tell	  us	  that	  we	  are	  wrong	  and	  that	  we	  smell	  the	  fruit	  flavour?	  In	  the	  example,	  Richardson	  provides	  us	  with	  two	  possible	  answers	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  holding	  one’s	  nose	  has	  done:	  
First	  answer:	  what’s	  missing	  when	  you	  hold	  your	  nose	  is	  one	  aspect	  or	  part	  of	  tasting.	  Holding	  your	  nose,	  on	  this	  view,	  impairs	  your	  ability	  to	  taste	  the	  flavours	  of	  the	  sweets.	  
Second	  answer:	  what’s	  missing	  is	  something	  olfactory—an	  olfactory	  experience,	  or	  an	  olfactory	  component	  of	  the	  multimodal	  experience	  of	  flavour.	  Holding	  your	  nose,	  accordingly,	  prevents	  the	  sense	  of	  smell	  from	  playing	  its	  usual	  role	  in	  flavour	  perception.	  (p.	  2)	  	   One	  can	  identify	  two	  questions	  that	  these	  answers	  might	  be	  answers	  to.	  One	  is:	  when	  one’s	  nose	  is	  blocked	  and	  one	  does	  not	  experience	  the	  fruitiness	  of	  the	  sweetie,	  is	  what	  is	  missing	  the	  use	  of	  the	  sensory	  modality	  of	  smell.	  (I	  will	  call	  this	  “the	  modality	  question”.)	  Another	  question	  is:	  when	  one’s	  nose	  is	  blocked	  and	  one	  does	  not	  experience	  the	  fruitiness	  of	  the	  sweetie,	  is	  one	  missing	  an	  olfactory	  experience	  or	  an	  olfactory	  component	  of	  the	  experience.	  Unlike	  the	  former	  question	  which	  addresses	  which	  sensory	  modality	  produced	  the	  experiences	  in	  question,	  or	  was	  in	  operation,	  this	  question	  asks	  about	  that	  experience	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  Is	  the	  experience,	  or	  are	  experiential	  components	  of	  it	  (the	  fruity	  ones),	  ones	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  smell?	  Does	  the	  experience	  have	  olfactory	  representational	  content	  and	  phenomenal	  character?	  (I	  will	  call	  this	  “the	  experiential	  question”.)	  Richardson	  elides	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  experiential	  question	  and	  the	  modality	  question	  in	  her	  statement	  of	  the	  first	  answer	  that	  she	  gives	  to	  the	  puzzle	  above.	  In	  her	  second	  answer,	  the	  first	  sentence	  seems	  to	  seek	  to	  answer	  the	  experiential	  question,	  while	  the	  second	  sentence	  seems	  to	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  modality	  question.	  These	  two	  questions	  are	  not	  the	  same,	  and	  one	  can	  see	  that	  this	  is	  so	  because,	  given	  certain	  assumptions,	  different	  answers	  could	  be	  given	  to	  them.	  To	  see	  this,	  we	  need	  to	  appreciate	  that	  there	  are,	  roughly,	  four	  competing	  theories	  of	  how	  we	  ought	  to	  individuate	  types	  of	  sensory	  modalities	  (as,	  later	  in	  her	  paper,	  Richardson	  notes).	  (See	  also	  H.	  P.	  Grice	  "Some	  Remarks	  About	  the	  Senses",	  in	  R.	  J.	  Butler	  (ed.),	  Analytical	  Philosophy,	  First	  Series,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1962.)	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One	  theory	  says	  that	  the	  modalities	  can	  be	  individuated	  by	  what	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  experiences	  produced	  by	  that	  modality.	  For	  example,	  vision	  is	  the	  modality	  defined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  coloured	  forms	  at	  a	  distance	  from	  the	  body	  are	  represented;	  olfaction	  is	  the	  modality	  by	  means	  of	  which	  smells	  or	  chemicals	  in	  the	  air	  are	  represented,	  and	  taste	  is	  the	  modality	  by	  means	  of	  which	  tastes	  or	  flavours	  or	  chemicals	  in	  solution	  are	  represented.	  On	  this	  theory,	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  modality	  and	  the	  experiential	  question	  will	  be	  the	  same,	  for	  it	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  experience	  that	  determines	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  modality	  in	  operation.	  A	  second	  theory	  says	  that	  the	  modalities	  can	  be	  individuated	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  the	  experiences	  that	  are	  produced	  by	  them.	  For	  example,	  vision	  is	  the	  modality	  that	  produces	  experiences	  with	  visual	  phenomenal	  character;	  olfaction	  is	  the	  modality	  that	  produces	  experiences	  with	  smell	  phenomenology;	  and	  taste	  is	  the	  modality	  that	  produces	  experiences	  with	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  taste.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  circularity	  in	  this	  last	  theory,	  one	  needs	  to	  be	  able	  to	  give	  a	  specification	  of	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  those	  types	  of	  experiences	  without	  saying	  simply	  that	  they	  are	  visual,	  smell	  or	  taste	  experiences.	  There	  are	  two	  ways	  I	  know	  to	  do	  that.	  One	  is	  to	  specify	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  an	  experience,	  by	  saying	  what	  it	  was	  an	  experience	  as	  of—that	  is,	  what	  the	  experience	  represents.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  criterion	  could	  turn	  out	  to	  look	  very	  much	  like	  the	  representational	  criterion.	  (Indeed,	  whether	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  an	  experience	  can	  be	  fully	  specified	  just	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  the	  experience	  represents	  is	  a	  point	  much	  disputed	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mind.)	  So	  one	  might	  specify	  a	  class	  of	  experiences	  with	  a	  certain	  phenomenal	  character	  by	  specifying	  a	  class	  of	  experiences	  that	  represent	  certain	  things.	  And	  then	  one	  could	  individuate	  the	  sensory	  modalities	  by	  claiming	  that	  each	  produces	  experiences	  that	  form	  different	  classes.	  Another	  way	  one	  might	  specify	  the	  sort	  of	  phenomenal	  character	  that	  all	  the	  experiences	  of	  one	  sense	  must	  have	  is	  to	  specify	  one	  type	  of	  experience	  and	  then	  cite	  a	  group	  of	  experiences	  related	  to	  it,	  say	  by	  phenomenal	  similarity,	  spelled	  out	  in	  terms	  of	  indiscriminability.	  (See	  A.	  Clark	  Sensory	  
Qualities,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1993.)	  By	  the	  lights	  of	  this	  second	  theory,	  like	  that	  of	  the	  first,	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  modality	  and	  the	  experiential	  question	  will	  be	  the	  same,	  for	  it	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  experience	  that	  determines	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  modality	  that	  is	  being	  used.	  A	  third	  theory	  says	  that	  the	  modalities	  are	  individuated	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  sensory	  organ	  (and	  perhaps	  brain	  processing)	  being	  used.	  For	  example,	  vision	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  modality	  that	  uses	  the	  eyes;	  olfaction	  the	  modality	  that	  uses	  the	  nose;	  taste	  the	  modality	  that	  uses	  the	  tongue;	  and	  so	  on.	  Unlike	  the	  first	  two	  theories,	  this	  theory	  predicts	  that	  the	  answers	  to	  the	  modality	  question	  and	  the	  experiential	  question	  can	  come	  apart,	  for	  a	  sense	  organ	  associated	  with	  one	  sense	  could	  produce	  an	  experience	  that	  had	  a	  representational	  content	  and	  phenomenal	  character	  associated	  with	  another	  sense.	  For	  example,	  the	  ear	  could	  produce	  an	  experience	  associated	  with	  vision.	  (One	  example	  of	  this	  happening	  is	  music-­‐colour	  synaesthesia,	  in	  which	  stimulation	  of	  the	  ear	  not	  only	  produces	  experiences	  of	  music	  but	  also	  experiences	  of	  colour—experiences	  that	  have	  a	  representational	  content	  and	  phenomenal	  character	  associated	  with	  vision.)	  The	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sensory	  organ	  theory	  would	  say	  that	  the	  modality	  being	  used	  is	  hearing,	  but	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  experience	  produced	  is	  visual.	  A	  fourth	  theory	  says	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  proximal	  stimulus	  is	  crucial	  for	  individuating	  the	  modalities.	  For	  example,	  vision	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  modality	  that	  has	  electromagnetic	  waves	  of	  certain	  wavelengths	  as	  its	  proximal	  stimulus;	  olfaction	  is	  the	  modality	  that	  has	  the	  proximal	  stimulus	  of	  certain	  chemicals	  in	  the	  air;	  and	  taste	  is	  the	  modality	  that	  has	  the	  proximal	  stimulus	  of	  certain	  chemicals	  in	  solution.	  According	  to	  this	  theory,	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  modality	  question	  and	  the	  experiential	  question	  can	  come	  apart	  for	  an	  experience	  with	  the	  representational	  content	  and	  phenomenal	  character	  associated	  with	  one	  modality	  could	  be	  produced	  by	  a	  proximal	  stimulus	  associated	  with	  another.	  (See	  the	  synaesthesia	  case	  described	  above.)	  In	  that	  case	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  sensory	  modality	  question	  and	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  experiential	  question	  would	  be	  different.	  	   These	  considerations	  show	  that	  one	  should	  differentiate	  between	  the	  experiential	  question	  and	  the	  modality	  question,	  for	  if	  one	  thought	  that	  questions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  modality	  turned	  on	  just	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  proximal	  stimulus	  or	  the	  sensory	  organ	  and	  not	  at	  all	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  experience,	  then	  one	  can	  give	  different	  answers	  to	  these	  questions.	  Thus,	  unless	  Richardson	  wants	  to	  defend	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  or	  representational	  criterion	  for	  individuating	  the	  senses,	  which	  she	  shows	  no	  sign	  of	  doing	  in	  her	  paper,	  she	  should	  be	  clearer	  about	  which	  question	  she	  is	  seeking	  an	  answer	  to.	  	   One	  might	  think	  that	  it	  is	  obvious,	  given	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  her	  paper	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  scientific	  findings	  could	  confirm	  or	  disconfirm	  our	  judgments	  about	  which	  sensory	  modality	  we	  are	  using,	  that	  Richardson	  is	  simply	  seeking	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  modality	  question.	  If	  so,	  it	  would	  be	  helpful	  at	  this	  crucial	  stage	  of	  setting	  up	  the	  debate	  if	  she	  were	  more	  precise.	  However,	  now	  that	  we	  can	  see	  that	  there	  are	  two	  questions	  here	  to	  be	  asked,	  one	  might	  wonder	  whether	  the	  evidence	  that	  Richardson	  brings	  to	  bear	  in	  answering	  the	  modality	  question	  is	  really	  evidence	  that	  is	  more	  suited	  to	  answering	  the	  experiential	  question,	  and	  thus	  whether	  she	  really	  means	  to	  investigate	  the	  modality	  question	  rather	  than	  the	  experiential	  question.	  I	  think	  that	  it	  is	  at	  least	  a	  teeny	  bit	  tempting	  to	  think	  that	  there	  are	  truths	  of	  folk	  psychology	  about	  the	  phenomenal	  and	  representational	  nature	  of	  experience,	  and	  a	  tiny	  bit	  tempting	  to	  think	  that	  science	  cannot	  inform	  one	  about	  those	  aspects	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  one’s	  experiences,	  although	  those	  claims	  are	  by	  no	  means	  certain.	  The	  alleged	  subjectivity	  of	  the	  mental	  speaks	  in	  favour	  of	  thinking	  those	  things.	  Whether	  or	  not	  they	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  true,	  I	  think	  that	  there	  are	  far	  more	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  science	  cannot	  address	  those	  questions	  than	  there	  are	  to	  think	  that	  science	  cannot	  tell	  us	  which	  sensory	  modality	  is	  in	  operation.	  (I	  will	  discuss	  why	  I	  think	  that	  the	  latter	  option	  is	  not	  tempting	  at	  all	  in	  sections	  two	  and	  three.)	  	   The	  separation	  of	  the	  modality	  and	  the	  experiential	  question	  thus	  reveals	  a	  third	  answer	  to	  the	  puzzle	  about	  the	  sweets	  that	  Richardson	  does	  not	  consider:	  the	  sensory	  modality	  that	  one	  uses	  to	  detect	  fruitiness	  is	  olfaction,	  but	  olfaction	  causes	  a	  taste	  experience:	  an	  experience	  that	  represents	  a	  quality	  that	  is	  in	  the	  mouth	  or	  in	  the	  objects	  that	  are	  in	  the	  mouth.	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  I	  believe	  that	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Richardson	  should	  be	  seeking	  an	  answer	  to	  both	  the	  experiential	  question	  and	  the	  modality	  question.	  And	  I	  would	  like	  to	  know	  to	  what	  extent	  she	  would	  alter	  the	  arguments	  in	  her	  paper	  when	  this	  distinction,	  and	  the	  different	  considerations	  that	  feed	  into	  deciding	  the	  answer	  to	  each	  question,	  are	  brought	  to	  her	  attention.	  That	  concludes	  discussion	  of	  my	  first	  point	  regarding	  the	  set-­‐up	  of	  the	  debate.	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  take	  Richardson	  to	  be	  asking	  the	  modality	  question,	  rather	  than	  the	  experiential	  question,	  and	  address	  her	  claims	  with	  respect	  to	  it.	  I	  will	  leave	  it	  to	  the	  reader	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  experiential	  question	  can	  or	  cannot	  be	  addressed	  by	  science,	  even	  if,	  as	  I	  will	  argue	  contra	  Richardson,	  we	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  the	  sensory	  modality	  question	  can	  be.	  
	  
§	  2	  The	  second	  point	  that	  I	  wish	  to	  discuss	  is	  Richardson’s	  claim	  that:	  if	  non–naturalism	  is	  correct,	  scientific	  findings	  can’t	  settle	  the	  puzzle	  about	  the	  sweets,	  since	  they	  can’t	  tell	  us	  that	  flavours	  are	  perceived	  olfactorily.	  This	  means,	  in	  turn,	  that	  if	  non–naturalism	  is	  correct,	  then	  science	  cannot	  overturn	  the	  common–sense	  judgement	  that	  flavours	  are	  just	  tasted.	  (p.	  12)	  I	  argue	  that	  Richardson	  is	  wrong	  and	  that	  this	  claim	  is	  false.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  non-­‐naturalism	  entails	  that	  scientific	  findings	  cannot	  confirm	  or	  disconfirm	  our	  judgments	  about	  which	  sense	  we	  are	  using	  to	  perceive	  the	  world	  on	  particular	  occasions.	  According	  to	  Richardson	  we	  should	  take	  a	  commitment	  to	  non-­‐naturalism	  to	  be	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  idea	  that:	  our	  everyday	  conception	  of	  the	  senses	  does	  not	  carry	  correctable,	  empirical	  commitments	  about	  how	  the	  senses	  are	  individuated.	  (p.	  9)	  Non-­‐naturalism	  comes	  in	  two	  forms,	  says	  Richardson.	  There	  is	  the	  conventionalist	  form	  defended	  by	  Matthew	  Nudds	  (“The	  Significance	  of	  the	  Senses”,	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  Society,	  2004,	  104(1):	  31–51)	  that	  denies	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  types	  of	  senses	  exists	  independently	  of	  our	  practice	  of	  so	  distinguishing	  them.	  According	  to	  Nudds,	  the	  distinctions	  we	  make	  between	  types	  of	  senses	  are	  purely	  based	  on	  our	  interests	  and	  not	  on	  objective	  similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  ways	  of	  perceiving.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  non-­‐conventionalist	  form	  of	  non-­‐naturalism.	  Articulating	  the	  non-­‐conventionalist	  form	  is	  a	  somewhat	  subtle	  matter.	  First	  Richardson	  tells	  us	  that,	  according	  to	  non-­‐conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalism,	  some	  things	  have	  no	  “hidden	  nature”	  (p.	  10).	  And	  we	  are	  told	  to	  take	  this	  to	  mean	  that	  “there	  is	  no	  question	  of	  our	  waiting	  to	  be	  told	  what	  makes	  them	  what	  they	  are	  by	  any	  science.”	  (p.	  10)	  There	  are	  two	  ways	  that	  one	  could	  go	  on	  to	  develop	  this	  idea.	  The	  first	  way	  would	  be	  to	  say	  that	  of	  some	  instance,	  there	  is	  no	  question	  of	  our	  waiting	  to	  be	  told	  by	  science	  that	  it	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  certain	  type—if	  that	  type	  is	  one	  that	  lacks	  a	  hidden	  nature.	  If	  one	  wanted	  to	  claim	  of	  
	   6	  
some	  instance	  that	  it	  was	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  certain	  type	  then	  one	  would	  have	  to	  know	  (at	  least)	  two	  things.	  First,	  one	  would	  have	  to	  know	  which	  property	  the	  instance	  must	  have	  in	  order	  to	  be	  an	  instance	  of	  the	  type.	  Second,	  one	  would	  have	  to	  know	  whether	  the	  instance	  had	  that	  property.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  how	  Richardson	  develops	  the	  point;	  indeed	  she	  eschews	  this	  articulation	  of	  the	  thesis.	  This	  is	  made	  manifest	  when	  she	  considers	  an	  instance	  of	  perception	  that	  we	  may	  not	  know	  is	  one	  of	  the	  type	  smelling—a	  type	  that	  she	  believes	  has	  no	  hidden	  nature.	  She	  says	  that	  science	  could	  show	  us	  that	  the	  instance	  was	  an	  instance	  of	  smelling	  by	  revealing	  that	  it	  had	  some	  surface	  feature	  that	  we	  did	  not	  know	  it	  had	  before:	  It	  is	  possible,	  on	  this	  view,	  that	  science	  might	  discover	  some	  instances	  of	  perception	  that	  have	  the	  surface	  feature	  that,	  on	  the	  everyday	  conception,	  is	  that	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  we	  count	  something	  as	  smelling,	  for	  instance.	  (p.	  11)	  Thus,	  Richardson	  thinks	  that	  science	  could	  tell	  us	  that	  an	  instance	  was	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  certain	  type	  that	  lacks	  a	  hidden	  nature	  because,	  of	  the	  two	  conditions	  required	  to	  know	  this—knowledge	  of	  which	  property	  makes	  it	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  certain	  type	  and	  knowledge	  of	  what	  its	  properties	  are—science	  could	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  second	  of	  these.	  Science	  could	  confirm	  or	  disconfirm	  which	  properties	  an	  instance	  had.	  The	  second	  way	  that	  one	  could	  develop	  the	  thought	  that	  “there	  is	  no	  question	  of	  our	  waiting	  to	  be	  told	  what	  makes	  them	  what	  they	  are	  by	  any	  science”	  is	  the	  one	  that	  Richardson	  adopts.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  types	  that	  lack	  a	  hidden	  nature	  are	  such	  that	  we	  know,	  independently	  of	  previous	  or	  future	  science,	  what	  it	  is	  for	  something	  to	  be	  an	  instance	  of	  that	  type.	  For	  example,	  suppose	  that	  we	  think	  that	  what	  it	  takes	  for	  an	  instance	  to	  be	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  certain	  type—a	  type	  that	  lacks	  a	  hidden	  nature—is	  that	  the	  instance	  has	  property	  p.	  That	  we	  think	  p	  makes	  the	  instance	  the	  instance	  of	  that	  type	  cannot	  be	  altered	  by	  scientific	  findings.	  Science	  cannot	  show	  us	  that	  it	  is	  really	  property	  q	  that	  makes	  an	  instance	  an	  instance	  of	  that	  type.	  Richardson	  says:	  What	  non–conventional	  non–naturalism	  will	  not	  countenance	  is	  that	  on	  our	  everyday	  conception,	  the	  features	  that	  individuate	  the	  senses	  are	  themselves	  up	  for	  scientific	  discovery.	  (p.	  12)	  Just	  to	  be	  clear,	  note	  that	  this	  is	  simply	  the	  first	  piece	  of	  knowledge	  that	  I	  identified	  above	  as	  one	  of	  (at	  least)	  two	  pieces	  of	  knowledge	  that	  one	  would	  need	  to	  have	  to	  have	  if	  one	  were	  to	  identify	  an	  instance	  as	  being	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  certain	  type.	  Richardson	  is	  thus	  claiming	  that	  if	  one	  holds	  that	  an	  instance	  is	  of	  a	  certain	  non-­‐hidden	  type,	  one	  could	  go	  wrong	  by	  ascribing	  the	  wrong	  properties	  to	  the	  object	  and	  science	  could	  correct	  us,	  but	  we	  could	  not	  go	  wrong	  by	  thinking	  that	  it	  was	  property	  p,	  rather	  than	  property	  q	  that	  made	  the	  instance	  an	  instance	  of	  the	  type	  in	  question.	  Therefore,	  to	  summarise,	  according	  to	  non-­‐conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalism,	  what	  science	  cannot	  do	  is	  tell	  us	  for	  each	  type	  of	  sense—types	  such	  as	  smell,	  touch	  and	  taste—what	  it	  is	  that	  makes	  an	  instance	  of	  perception	  an	  instance	  of	  the	  particular	  type	  that	  it	  is.	  Science	  cannot	  discover	  which	  property	  it	  is	  that	  makes	  instances	  of	  perception	  instances	  of	  one	  of	  the	  sensory	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modalities,	  like	  smell,	  touch,	  taste,	  and	  so	  on.	  However,	  claims	  Richardson,	  according	  to	  non-­‐conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalism,	  science	  can	  inform	  us,	  when	  we	  didn’t	  know	  before,	  that	  an	  individual	  instance	  of	  perception	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  smelling.	  It	  could	  do	  this	  by	  showing	  us	  that	  the	  instance	  had	  a	  surface	  feature	  that	  we	  did	  not	  previously	  know	  that	  it	  did.	  Given	  this	  understanding	  of	  non-­‐conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalism,	  it	  is	  highly	  perplexing	  that	  Richardson	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  in	  the	  very	  next	  paragraph	  that:	  if	  non–naturalism	  is	  correct,	  scientific	  findings	  can’t	  settle	  the	  puzzle	  about	  the	  sweets,	  since	  they	  can’t	  tell	  us	  that	  flavours	  are	  perceived	  olfactorily.”	  (p.	  12)	  That	  just	  does	  not	  follow.	  Here	  is	  why.	  Richardson	  herself	  says	  that	  a	  non-­‐conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalist	  could	  hold	  a	  variety	  of	  views	  about	  what	  surface	  feature	  makes	  instances	  of	  a	  sense	  instances	  of	  the	  type	  of	  sense	  that	  they	  are:	  The	  most	  obvious	  candidate	  for	  these	  surface	  features	  is	  some	  aspect	  of	  phenomenal	  character.	  But	  there	  are	  other	  options,	  too,	  such	  as	  the	  perceiving	  of	  certain	  properties	  rather	  than	  others,	  or	  the	  use	  of	  certain	  parts	  of	  the	  body	  (the	  ones	  we	  usually	  think	  of	  as	  sense	  organs)	  in	  perceiving,	  or	  perhaps	  some	  combination	  of	  factors	  like	  these.”	  (p.	  11)	  Thus	  a	  non-­‐conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalist	  could	  hold	  that	  what	  makes	  an	  instance	  of	  perception	  one	  of	  the	  type	  olfaction	  is	  that	  it	  involves	  appropriate	  stimulation	  of	  the	  nose.	  In	  that	  case,	  if	  science	  discovered	  in	  the	  puzzle	  of	  the	  sweets	  that	  what	  we	  generally	  took	  to	  be	  an	  instance	  of	  tasting—because	  we	  took	  the	  tongue	  to	  be	  causally	  responsible—was	  in	  fact	  produced	  by	  means	  of	  the	  nose,	  then	  science	  would	  have	  discovered	  that	  the	  instance	  was	  not	  one	  of	  tasting	  but	  one	  of	  olfaction	  instead.	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  would	  be	  a	  case	  where	  science	  discovered:	  some	  instances	  of	  perception	  that	  have	  the	  surface	  feature	  that,	  on	  the	  everyday	  conception,	  is	  that	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  we	  count	  something	  as	  smelling	  (p.	  11).	  So	  science	  could	  show	  us,	  consistent	  with	  non-­‐conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalism,	  that	  the	  second	  answer	  to	  the	  puzzle	  of	  the	  sweets	  was	  the	  correct	  one.	  It	  could	  show	  us	  that	  “[h]olding	  your	  nose,	  accordingly,	  prevents	  the	  sense	  of	  smell	  from	  playing	  its	  usual	  role	  in	  flavour	  perception.”	  (p.	  2)	  Only	  if	  one	  holds	  non-­‐conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalism	  together	  with	  a	  certain	  specific	  claim	  or	  claims	  about	  what	  individuates	  the	  sensory	  modalities	  can	  one	  resist	  the	  thought	  that	  science	  cannot	  confirm	  or	  overturn	  our	  judgment	  in	  the	  puzzle	  of	  the	  sweets.	  For	  example,	  if	  one	  held,	  in	  addition	  to	  non-­‐conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalism,	  that	  what	  makes	  some	  instance	  an	  instance	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  taste	  sensory	  modality	  the	  fact	  that	  flavour	  is	  experienced,	  and	  one	  took	  that	  to	  be	  a	  fact	  that	  could	  not	  be	  overturned	  by	  science,	  then	  finding	  out	  that	  the	  nose	  was	  involved	  in	  flavour	  perception	  would	  be	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  sweetie	  case	  (at	  least	  if	  that	  was	  the	  only	  surface	  fact	  that	  one	  held	  to	  be	  true—see	  the	  following	  paragraph).	  But	  holding	  that	  is	  to	  hold	  a	  specific	  claim	  about	  what	  individuates	  the	  taste	  modality	  that	  is	  an	  optional	  addition	  to	  one’s	  non-­‐naturalistic	  theory.	  Non-­‐conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalism	  need	  not	  be	  combined	  with	  such	  a	  claim.	  Combined	  with	  other	  claims,	  such	  as	  what	  makes	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some	  instance	  an	  instance	  of	  olfaction	  is	  that	  it	  is	  produced	  by	  the	  nose,	  or	  that	  it	  is	  produced	  by	  the	  proximal	  stimuli	  of	  odours	  or	  chemicals	  in	  the	  air,	  non-­‐conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalism	  is	  compatible	  with	  thinking	  that	  the	  second	  answer	  to	  the	  puzzle	  about	  the	  sweets	  is	  correct,	  and	  correct	  in	  light	  of	  new	  scientific	  findings.	  Therefore	  non-­‐conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalism	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  we	  cannot	  show	  that	  science	  can	  inform	  us	  about	  which	  sensory	  modality	  we	  are	  using.	  What	  this	  case	  also	  brings	  out	  is	  that	  one	  might	  start	  off	  with	  what	  one	  takes	  to	  be	  several	  surface	  facts	  that	  are	  not	  open	  to	  revision	  but	  then	  realise	  that	  one	  is	  forced	  to	  revise	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  apparent	  surface	  facts.	  For	  example,	  one	  might	  start	  off	  believing	  the	  following	  to	  be	  surface	  facts:	  (a) fruitiness	  is	  a	  flavour,	  (b) flavour	  is	  only	  perceived	  by	  the	  modality	  of	  taste,	  and	  (c) anything	  perceived	  by	  means	  of	  the	  nose	  is	  perceived	  by	  the	  modality	  of	  smell.	  If	  one	  then	  discovers	  that	  if	  one	  holds	  one’s	  nose	  then	  one	  cannot	  experience	  fruitiness	  then	  one	  would	  face	  just	  such	  a	  decision.	  One	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  give	  up	  on	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  apparent	  surface	  facts.	  Of	  course	  which	  one	  or	  ones	  one	  should	  give	  up	  in	  such	  a	  situation	  is	  a	  difficult	  matter.	  But	  what	  the	  science	  would	  have	  shown	  is	  that	  at	  least	  one	  of	  them	  needs	  to	  be	  given	  up.	  	   I	  think	  that	  the	  same	  points	  hold,	  mutatis	  mutandis,	  for	  conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalism.	  Only	  when	  that	  view	  is	  combined	  with	  a	  certain	  view	  of	  what	  the	  conventions	  are	  for	  individuating	  the	  senses,	  does	  one	  reach	  the	  conclusion	  that	  science	  cannot	  affirm	  or	  correct	  our	  judgment	  about	  which	  sense	  is	  being	  used	  on	  a	  particular	  occasion.	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  according	  to	  all	  forms	  of	  conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalism	  “we	  don’t	  make	  the	  distinction	  [between	  the	  senses]	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  pick	  out	  objective	  similarities	  and	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  that	  our	  perceivings	  are	  produced	  by	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  environment	  on	  our	  internal	  perceptual	  equipment”	  (p.	  9),	  this	  does	  entail	  that	  the	  distinction	  that	  we	  make	  between	  the	  senses	  is	  not	  in	  fact	  one	  that	  picks	  out	  objective	  similarities	  and	  differences.	  What	  is	  crucial	  is	  that	  we	  are	  driven	  only	  by	  what	  matters	  to	  us	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  But	  what	  matters	  to	  us	  could	  be	  conveying	  to	  people	  what	  sensory	  organ	  we	  are	  using,	  and	  such	  a	  feature	  is	  of	  course	  one	  that	  actually	  picks	  out	  objective	  similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  the	  senses,	  even	  if	  that	  was	  not	  our	  motivation	  for	  so	  selecting	  it.	  If	  one	  held	  such	  a	  view,	  then	  if	  science	  provided	  conclusive	  evidence	  that	  an	  instance	  of	  perceiving	  involved	  using	  the	  nose,	  and	  this	  overturned	  one’s	  belief	  that	  the	  tongue	  was	  involved,	  then	  one	  would	  be	  committed	  to	  changing	  one’s	  view	  about	  which	  sensory	  modality	  was	  being	  used	  to	  perceive.	  Thus	  conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalism,	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalism,	  can	  hold	  that	  science	  can	  inform	  us	  about	  the	  puzzle	  of	  the	  sweets.	  Thus,	  the	  conclusion	  of	  my	  second	  point	  about	  Richardson’s	  paper	  is	  that	  she	  has	  not	  shown,	  as	  she	  takes	  herself	  to	  have	  done,	  that	  “if	  non–naturalism	  is	  correct,	  scientific	  findings	  can’t	  settle	  the	  puzzle	  about	  the	  sweets,	  since	  they	  can’t	  tell	  us	  that	  flavours	  are	  perceived	  olfactorily”	  and	  that	  “[t]his	  means,	  in	  turn,	  that	  if	  non–naturalism	  is	  correct,	  then	  science	  cannot	  overturn	  the	  common–
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sense	  judgement	  that	  flavours	  are	  just	  tasted.”	  (p.	  12)	  An	  argument	  for	  her	  conclusion	  would	  also	  have	  to	  rest	  on	  premises	  about	  what	  claims	  form	  the	  core	  conception	  of	  the	  senses	  that,	  according	  to	  non-­‐naturalism,	  are	  not	  revisable.	  Richardson	  does	  not	  provide	  such	  a	  list	  of	  claims	  in	  her	  paper.	  Nor	  does	  Richardson	  provide	  an	  argument	  or	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  certain	  claims	  cannot	  be	  revised,	  as	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  section	  three	  below.	  Without	  that,	  her	  claim	  that	  science	  cannot	  discover	  which	  property	  it	  is	  that	  makes	  instances	  of	  perception	  instances	  of	  the	  type	  of	  perception	  that	  they	  are,	  is	  groundless.	  Recall	  that	  this	  was	  the	  first	  piece	  of	  knowledge	  that	  I	  identified	  above	  as	  one	  of	  (at	  least)	  two	  pieces	  of	  knowledge	  that	  one	  would	  need	  to	  have	  to	  have	  if	  one	  were	  to	  identify	  an	  instance	  as	  being	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  certain	  type.	  And	  it	  was	  also	  the	  main	  claim	  that	  Richardson	  developed	  from	  the	  definitional	  statement	  of	  non-­‐conventionalist	  non-­‐naturalism	  that	  the	  senses	  have	  no	  hidden	  nature.	  Moreover,	  even	  if	  Richardson	  provided	  a	  list	  of	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  think	  are	  not	  revisable,	  she	  would	  still	  have	  to	  show	  that	  we	  would	  not	  be	  forced	  to	  revise	  one	  or	  more	  of	  them	  in	  light	  of	  contemporary	  science	  showing	  that	  they	  cannot	  all	  be	  held	  together,	  as	  in	  the	  example	  I	  outlined	  three	  paragraphs	  above.	  Furthermore,	  she	  would	  have	  to	  show	  that	  no	  scientific	  claim	  whatsoever—not	  just	  the	  claim	  made	  in	  the	  puzzle	  of	  the	  sweets—would	  cause	  us	  to	  revise	  which	  sensory	  modality	  we	  took	  to	  be	  operative	  in	  any	  case	  of	  perception.	  The	  magnitude	  and	  strength	  of	  the	  claims	  that	  would	  have	  to	  be	  established	  before	  Richardson	  could	  claim	  to	  have	  shown	  that	  science	  cannot	  inform	  us	  about	  which	  sensory	  modality	  we	  are	  using	  go	  far	  beyond	  those	  that	  she	  establishes	  in	  her	  paper.	  	  
§	  3	  	   The	  third	  point	  that	  I	  want	  to	  make	  concerns	  Richardson’s	  stance	  on	  the	  question	  of	  how	  many	  senses	  there	  are	  and	  her	  motivation	  in	  this	  paper	  to	  partially	  defend	  non-­‐naturalism	  about	  the	  individuation	  of	  the	  senses	  (at	  least	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  show	  that	  it	  should	  not	  be	  dismissed).	  I	  begin	  with	  her	  discussion	  of	  the	  question	  of	  how	  many	  senses	  we	  have.	  	   Matthew	  Nudds	  (ibid.)	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  a	  fact	  of	  folk-­‐psychology—a	  conventionalist	  fact	  that	  cannot	  be	  overturned	  by	  scientific	  investigation—that	  there	  are	  five	  and	  could	  only	  be	  five	  senses.	  Vision,	  hearing,	  touch,	  taste	  and	  smell	  are	  known	  as	  the	  Aristotelian	  five,	  as	  Aristotle	  promoted	  the	  view	  that	  there	  were	  just	  this	  number.	  I	  have	  argued	  (“Individuating	  the	  Senses”,	  in	  Macpherson,	  F	  (ed.)	  The	  Senses:	  Classic	  and	  Contemporary	  Readings.	  New	  York:	  OUP,	  2011),	  contra	  Nudds,	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  fact	  of	  folk-­‐psychology.	  First,	  I	  argue	  that	  ordinary	  people	  (the	  folk)	  and	  scientists	  would	  and	  do	  respond	  to	  new	  information	  about	  human	  and	  animal	  perceptual	  capacities	  by	  saying	  that	  there	  are	  more	  than	  five	  senses.	  These	  facts	  might	  include	  facts	  about	  other	  creatures’	  sensitivity	  to	  things	  such	  as	  magnetic	  fields,	  and	  facts	  about	  human	  proprioception	  and	  equilibrioception.	  Indeed,	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  number	  of	  the	  senses	  goes	  back	  in	  writing	  to	  before	  Aristotle’s	  time,	  and	  has	  been	  one	  of	  recurrent	  discussion	  through	  out	  human	  history	  thereafter.	  (See	  K.	  M.	  Dallenbach	  “Pain:	  History	  and	  Present	  Status”,	  American	  Journal	  of	  Psychology,	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1939,	  52(3):	  331–47	  for	  a	  learned	  summary	  of	  just	  how	  much	  debate	  there	  has	  been.)	  Second,	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  there	  being	  many	  different	  senses	  abounds	  in	  popular	  literature.	  Consider:	  
§ X-­‐ray	  vision	  
§ mind-­‐reading	  sense	  
§ sixth	  sense—the	  ability	  to	  perceive	  the	  future,	  ghosts,	  and	  so	  on	  
§ the	  Predator’s	  infrared	  perception	  
§ the	  Terminator’s	  perception,	  which	  can	  analyze	  the	  composition	  of	  objects	  
§ spider	  sense—the	  ability	  to	  perceive	  danger	  via	  a	  special	  tingling	  in	  the	  extremities	  I	  maintain	  that	  these	  examples	  show	  that	  the	  folk	  are	  only	  too	  ready	  to	  countenance	  the	  possibility	  of	  other	  senses.	  Richardson	  responds	  to	  these	  points	  by	  claiming	  that	  people’s	  responses	  to	  the	  scientific	  data	  and	  sci-­‐fi	  literature	  do	  not	  “constitute	  evidence	  of	  our	  being	  disposed	  to	  revise	  our	  everyday	  conception	  of	  the	  senses”	  (p.	  14)	  For	  if	  we	  ask	  people	  what	  they	  think	  or	  believe,	  it	  is	  just	  not	  clear	  to	  them	  and	  they	  may	  get	  it	  wrong:	  “folk	  judgement	  about	  the	  senses	  may	  not,	  as	  it	  were,	  be	  transparent	  to	  itself”	  (p.	  12).	  In	  particular,	  she	  claims	  that	  although	  the	  folk	  and	  scientists	  say	  that	  they	  believe	  that	  there	  are	  and	  could	  be	  more	  than	  five	  senses,	  and	  cite	  what	  some	  of	  those	  are	  and	  could	  be,	  this	  is	  only	  a	  temporary	  state	  that	  they	  are	  in,	  and	  occurs	  just	  after	  they	  have	  been	  exposed	  to	  the	  new	  information	  or	  after	  they	  have	  read	  some	  sci-­‐fi.	  They	  will	  quickly	  revert	  to	  saying,	  as	  they	  did	  before,	  that	  there	  are	  five	  and	  only	  five	  senses,	  and	  could	  be	  only	  five	  senses.	  So,	  claims	  Richardson,	  non-­‐naturalism	  about	  the	  senses	  is	  not	  easily	  defeated	  by	  the	  sort	  of	  evidence	  that	  I	  cite	  above.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  me	  whether	  Richardson	  thinks	  that	  people	  temporarily	  believe	  that	  there	  are	  more	  than	  five	  senses	  and	  then	  revert	  to	  their	  long-­‐standing	  belief	  that	  there	  are	  and	  could	  only	  be	  five,	  or	  if	  she	  thinks	  that	  they	  never	  lose	  their	  long-­‐standing	  belief	  and	  only	  pay	  “lip-­‐service”	  to	  the	  thought	  that	  there	  could	  be	  more	  than	  five	  senses.	  (See	  p.	  14.)	  While	  at	  times	  she	  suggests	  that	  people	  may	  say	  things	  and	  not	  believe	  them	  at	  all,	  her	  talk	  of	  there	  not	  being	  “a	  more	  long-­‐term	  change	  in	  the	  judgements”	  people	  make,	  suggests	  that	  she	  thinks	  that	  there	  might	  be	  short-­‐term	  changes	  of	  judgement.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  she	  had	  better	  hold	  the	  view	  that	  people	  are	  merely	  pay	  lip-­‐service	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  are	  more	  than	  five	  senses,	  for	  if	  people	  temporarily	  change	  their	  belief	  then	  such	  a	  belief	  is	  revisable	  in	  the	  light	  of	  new	  scientific	  evidence.	  And	  that	  is	  precisely	  all	  that	  the	  naturalist	  needs	  to	  make	  their	  case	  in	  this	  situation.	  In	  any	  case,	  what	  is	  the	  evidence	  that	  people	  revert	  to	  having	  the	  belief	  that	  there	  are	  and	  could	  be	  only	  five	  senses	  either	  after	  temporarily	  judging	  that	  there	  are	  more	  or	  paying	  this	  idea	  lip-­‐service?	  None	  is	  cited.	  I	  don’t	  in	  my	  everyday	  life.	  Am	  I	  that	  odd?	  I	  doubt	  it.	  I	  doubt	  whether	  Plato	  who	  thought	  that	  the	  sense	  of	  touch	  was	  three	  senses—pressure,	  temperature	  and	  heat—reverted	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  there	  are	  only	  five	  senses	  on	  his	  days	  off,	  if	  he	  ever	  had	  the	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belief	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Likewise,	  consider	  those	  who	  took	  part	  in	  the	  historical	  debate	  about	  which	  senses	  there	  are.	  Their	  debate	  was	  based	  on	  data	  from	  first	  person	  experience.	  Consider,	  in	  particular,	  those	  who	  held	  that	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  hunger	  and	  thirst,	  of	  the	  fullness	  of	  the	  bladder.	  I	  know	  of	  no	  evidence	  that	  suggests	  that	  those	  participants	  ever	  had	  the	  belief	  that	  there	  are	  and	  could	  be	  only	  five	  senses,	  or	  that	  if	  they	  did	  they	  reverted	  to	  that	  belief	  when	  they	  left	  their	  studies.	  Nor	  do	  I	  think	  that	  the	  many	  contemporary	  philosophers	  and	  scientists	  that	  I	  talk	  to	  and	  read	  on	  a	  regular	  basis	  about	  these	  matters	  revert,	  at	  the	  weekends,	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  there	  are	  five	  and	  could	  be	  only	  five	  senses.	  The	  thought	  that	  this	  is	  what	  people	  return	  to	  believing	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  ascribe	  to	  them	  the	  mentality	  of	  a	  juvenile	  who	  has	  been	  told	  that	  there	  are	  five	  senses	  at	  school	  and	  repeatedly	  parrots	  this	  back,	  unable	  to	  retain	  new	  beliefs	  gained	  from	  reading	  literature	  and	  science.	  But	  this	  is	  just	  not	  what	  people	  are	  like.	  The	  idea	  that	  the	  folk	  and	  scientists	  are	  simple	  unsophisticated	  creatures	  about	  perception	  with	  deep-­‐seated	  Aristotelian	  beliefs	  seems	  to	  me	  only	  a	  philosopher’s	  concoction.	  And	  even	  if	  there	  are	  people	  who	  revert	  to	  claiming	  that	  there	  are	  and	  could	  be	  five	  and	  only	  five	  senses	  after	  proclaiming	  otherwise	  due	  to	  reading	  some	  science,	  as	  Richardson	  says	  she	  does,	  why	  should	  we	  take	  the	  former	  evidence,	  rather	  than	  the	  latter,	  as	  the	  evidence	  of	  their	  settled	  and	  long-­‐standing	  belief?	  To	  make	  it	  clear	  why	  one	  might	  not	  want	  to	  do	  that,	  consider	  a	  person	  who	  knows	  a	  little	  bit	  of	  astronomy	  and	  who	  knows	  that	  the	  Earth	  revolves	  around	  the	  Sun,	  and	  not	  vice	  versa.	  In	  the	  classroom,	  or	  after	  reading	  some	  affirming	  scientific	  facts	  about	  the	  motions	  of	  the	  heavenly	  bodies,	  such	  a	  person	  will	  no	  doubt	  say	  that	  the	  sun	  is	  stationary	  and	  that	  the	  Earth	  revolves	  around	  it.	  Yet,	  in	  other	  contexts	  they	  may	  affirm	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Sun	  rises	  in	  the	  morning,	  travels	  across	  the	  sky	  and	  then	  moves	  down	  below	  the	  horizon	  in	  the	  evening.	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  willing	  in	  an	  every-­‐day	  situation	  to	  affirm	  such	  propositions	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  should	  think	  that	  they	  really	  believe	  that	  the	  Sun	  moves	  and	  the	  Earth	  stays	  still.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  most	  people	  would	  explain	  away	  this	  talk	  as	  idiom	  or	  something	  close	  to	  it.	  Idioms	  are	  phrases	  that	  have	  both	  a	  literal	  and	  a	  figurative	  meaning.	  “She	  pulled	  his	  leg”	  literally	  means	  that	  she	  held	  his	  leg	  and	  tugged	  it.	  But	  when	  people	  assert	  this,	  they	  don’t	  intend	  the	  literal	  meaning,	  just	  the	  figurative	  meaning,	  which	  is	  that	  she	  poked	  fun	  at	  him	  by	  suggesting	  something	  to	  him	  that	  was	  false	  or	  exaggerated.	  When	  people	  knowledgeable	  of	  astronomy	  speak	  of	  the	  Sun	  rising	  and	  traveling	  across	  the	  sky	  they	  don’t	  mean	  this	  literally.	  They	  mean	  it	  figuratively,	  or	  something	  close	  to	  figuratively,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  to	  an	  observer	  on	  Earth,	  this	  is	  what	  appears	  to	  happen	  during	  the	  course	  of	  a	  day.	  Likewise,	  consider	  people	  who	  have	  encountered	  sci-­‐fi	  and	  science	  and	  have	  affirmed	  that	  there	  are	  or	  could	  be	  more	  than	  five	  senses.	  If,	  subsequently,	  they	  say	  that	  there	  are	  just	  five	  senses,	  I	  suggest	  that	  they	  intend	  to	  mean	  that	  there	  are	  five	  main	  or	  paradigm	  human	  senses,	  or	  that	  there	  are	  five	  commonly	  noted	  and	  agreed	  upon	  senses.	  Not	  only	  am	  I	  unconvinced	  that	  Richardson	  is	  right	  that	  it	  is	  a	  tenet	  of	  folk	  psychology	  which	  cannot	  be	  revised	  that	  there	  are	  five	  and	  only	  five	  senses,	  I	  am	  highly	  sceptical	  that	  there	  are	  beliefs	  about	  the	  individuation	  of	  the	  senses	  that	  are	  part	  of	  folk-­‐psychology	  that	  cannot	  be	  revised.	  Richardson	  tells	  us	  that	  the	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belief	  that	  “flavours	  are	  just	  tasted”	  (p.	  4)	  is	  one	  such,	  while	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  use	  of	  the	  nose	  is	  sufficient	  for	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  modality	  of	  smell	  (c.f.	  p.	  6)	  and	  the	  belief	  that	  “what’s	  happening	  when	  flavours	  are	  perceived	  is	  in	  the	  mouth”	  (p.	  19)	  are	  not.	  These	  latter	  revisable	  beliefs	  she	  calls	  “peripheral”,	  while	  the	  ones	  that	  cannot	  be	  revised	  are	  “non-­‐peripheral”	  (p.	  19)	  or	  part	  of	  the	  core-­‐conception	  of	  the	  senses.	  However,	  she	  proffers	  no	  reason	  to	  categorise	  these	  beliefs	  in	  this	  way.	  Indeed,	  concerning	  the	  last	  of	  these	  beliefs,	  the	  best	  Richardson	  can	  do	  to	  convince	  us	  that	  it	  can	  be	  revised	  is	  to	  say	  that	  “without	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  the	  …	  [belief]	  is	  non–peripheral	  to	  our	  everyday	  conception,	  the	  view	  that	  it	  is	  peripheral	  remains	  plausible”	  (p.	  20).	  Given	  this,	  I	  see	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  “flavours	  are	  just	  tasted”	  is	  part	  of	  the	  core-­‐conception	  that	  cannot	  be	  revised	  and	  is	  not	  peripheral.	  I	  can	  see	  no	  good	  reason	  for	  Richardson	  to	  favour	  this	  fact	  over	  the	  others.	  More	  generally,	  I	  can	  see	  no	  motivation	  whatsoever	  for	  thinking	  that	  there	  are	  beliefs	  about	  the	  number	  of	  the	  senses,	  or	  beliefs	  about	  the	  individuation	  of	  the	  senses,	  that	  cannot	  be	  revised.	  Certainly,	  there	  will	  be	  beliefs	  that	  we	  hold	  more	  strongly	  than	  others.	  And	  there	  will	  be	  ones	  the	  giving	  up	  of	  which	  will	  be	  resisted	  more	  than	  others.	  But	  the	  thought	  that	  there	  are	  some	  core	  beliefs	  that	  simply	  cannot	  be	  given	  up	  is	  ungrounded.	  No	  doubt	  when	  science	  tells	  us	  some	  fact—for	  example,	  that	  certain	  flavours,	  such	  as	  the	  fruit	  flavours,	  cannot	  be	  detected	  when	  the	  nose	  is	  not	  operative—science	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  which	  of	  the	  common	  beliefs	  that	  we	  may	  be	  inclined	  to	  hold	  we	  should	  give	  up,	  if	  giving	  up	  one	  or	  more	  is	  required.	  Should	  we	  give	  up	  that	  flavours	  are	  tasted	  or	  should	  we	  give	  up	  that	  use	  of	  the	  nose	  is	  use	  of	  the	  modality	  of	  smell	  and	  that	  what’s	  happening	  when	  flavours	  are	  perceived	  is	  in	  the	  mouth?	  Settling	  that	  question	  should	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  doing	  least	  damage	  or	  revision	  to	  our	  beliefs.	  If	  we	  have	  to	  revise	  our	  beliefs	  in	  light	  of	  science	  then	  it	  seems	  that	  we	  should	  heed	  Quine’s	  advice	  (“Posits	  and	  Reality”,	  reprinted	  in	  The	  Ways	  of	  Paradox	  and	  
Other	  Essays,	  Cambridge,	  M.A.:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1955)	  and	  seek	  to	  maximize	  simplicity,	  familiarity,	  scope,	  fecundity,	  and	  conformity	  to	  experience,	  while	  making	  the	  smallest	  possible	  number	  of	  changes	  to	  the	  fewest	  core	  beliefs	  we	  can	  that	  will	  suffice	  to	  reconcile	  the	  beliefs	  with	  experience.	  However,	  doing	  that	  may	  involve	  changing	  core	  strongly	  held	  beliefs.	  One	  can	  imagine	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  one	  belief,	  which	  was	  agreed	  by	  all	  to	  be	  very	  strongly	  held,	  should	  be	  given	  up	  to	  spare	  a	  large	  number	  of	  less	  strongly	  held,	  more	  peripheral,	  beliefs.	  When	  one	  thinks	  more	  generally	  about	  beliefs	  that	  philosophers	  have	  thought	  not	  to	  be	  revisable	  by	  any	  empirical	  evidence,	  one	  thinks	  of	  beliefs	  concerning	  fundamental	  logical	  principles,	  such	  as	  bivalence,	  and	  beliefs	  concerning	  mathematics.	  But	  many	  people	  have	  challenged	  whether	  even	  any	  of	  these	  are	  immune	  from	  revision.	  (See	  Quine,	  ibid.)	  If	  Richardson	  thinks	  that	  one	  or	  more	  beliefs	  about	  our	  senses	  falls	  into	  this	  category,	  then	  Quine	  would	  say	  that	  it	  or	  they	  can	  be	  preserved	  come	  what	  may,	  if	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  make	  enough	  other	  changes	  in	  our	  web	  of	  belief.	  But	  the	  question	  is	  why	  we	  should	  privilege	  such	  beliefs.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  logic,	  some	  answers	  can	  be	  adduced.	  Logical	  beliefs	  seem	  not	  only	  to	  be	  beliefs	  that	  form	  the	  web	  but	  the	  beliefs	  that	  tie	  the	  web	  together	  in	  an	  inferential	  structure	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Of	  course	  whether	  this	  actually	  warrants	  holding	  beliefs	  about	  logic	  are	  special	  is	  arguable.	  However,	  no	  such	  reasons	  seem	  forthcoming	  in	  the	  case	  of	  beliefs	  about	  the	  sensory	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modalities,	  not	  even	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  belief	  that	  “flavours	  are	  tasted”.	  But	  those	  are	  precisely	  the	  kind	  of	  reasons	  that	  are	  required	  if	  a	  non-­‐naturalism	  is	  to	  be	  found	  even	  plausible—even	  a	  contending	  theory—as	  Richardson	  argues	  it	  is.	  Thus	  I	  conclude	  that	  we	  have	  no	  good	  reasons	  to	  hold	  that	  non-­‐naturalism	  is	  well	  motivated,	  and	  Richardson’s	  claims	  about	  people’s	  beliefs	  about	  the	  number	  and	  the	  individuation	  of	  the	  senses,	  are	  highly	  implausible.	  	  
§	  4	  In	  summary,	  I	  first	  argued	  that	  Richardson	  does	  not	  keep	  separate	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  science	  can	  inform	  us	  about	  the	  type	  of	  experience	  that	  we	  are	  having	  (the	  experiential	  question)	  from	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  science	  can	  inform	  us	  about	  the	  type	  of	  sensory	  modality	  that	  is	  being	  used	  (the	  modality	  question).	  I	  suggested	  that	  she	  should	  be	  considering	  both,	  and	  wondered	  whether	  her	  arguments	  were	  not	  better	  suited	  to	  answering	  the	  experiential	  question,	  rather	  than	  the	  modality	  question,	  which	  she	  claims	  to	  be	  addressing.	  Second,	  I	  showed	  that	  it	  is	  false	  that	  non-­‐naturalism	  entails	  that	  we	  cannot	  show	  that	  science	  can	  inform	  us	  about	  which	  sensory	  modality	  we	  are	  using.	  This	  point	  is	  vital	  for	  it	  amounts	  to	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  main	  claim	  that	  Richardson	  argues	  for	  in	  her	  paper.	  Third,	  I	  argued	  that	  Richardson	  provides	  us	  with	  no	  good	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  there	  are	  either	  beliefs	  about	  the	  number—actual	  or	  possible—of	  sensory	  modalities	  or	  beliefs	  about	  individuating	  the	  senses	  that	  cannot	  be	  revised,	  and	  I	  have	  identified	  reasons	  to	  strongly	  resist	  her	  claims	  about	  what	  people	  believe	  about	  these	  matters.	  
